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A brief look at a troubling topic
“Corrosion, you see, whether on iron or any other material, is something that never stops. 
We can fix it when it happens, and we can try to prevent it, but all we can ever really do is
slow it down.  That’s why we call it the pervasive menace.”[1]
                                                Dan Dumire, Corrosion Prevention and Contol, DoD
Are today’s career officers more cynical than officers of previous eras, and how much more
corrosive is their cynicism?  It turns out these are impossible questions to answer.  They are
also irrelevant.  No cynic cares whether things were equally or even more screwed up in the
past.  Cynics live in the present.  What matters to them is what is problematic now – and
today’s post-command and command-select career officers are cynical.
While some causes of cynicism are as old as soldiering, others are new and are intensifying. 
Consequently, we should worry about what it means when officers on the command track in
Special Operations Forces (SOF) openly acknowledge that their faith in Higher Command is
eroding, or has eroded; when they consider the prospect of military success to be dim; and/or
when they see little to no prospect of increased professional satisfaction lying ahead.  We
should worry about what this will do to retention and recruitment.  We should also worry
about cynicism’s long-term impacts on decision-making by those who do choose to stay in
and are on the path to becoming senior leaders themselves, especially if internally generated,
never mind societal, sources of cynicism worsen. 
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In what follows I draw on 20 years of observation and discussions with hundreds of SOF
officers in and out of the classroom, as well as lengthy one-on-one conversations with a
number of command-select individuals.  These conversations began in late 2018, and by
‘command-select’ I refer to officers who have had tactical battalion command or its
equivalent, and thus are among those who the military should want to listen to.
I embarked on this project because I had never heard SOF O3s and O4s express as much
open cynicism as I was hearing in my classes by late 2018.[2]  After 20 years of teaching SOF
O3s and O4s at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), what struck me hardest was that
students weren’t just willing to openly acknowledge that they were cynical, but their cynicism
didn’t seem to faze them.  Instead, they were quite accepting of it. 
Our graduates – who now include general officers – were also cynical.  But given their
numerous deployments, I thought, this stood to reason.  However, O3s – what was going on?
Of course, when I first started teaching at NPS in 1999, the U.S. was not at war.  But – it
turns out that being at war is the crux of the problem: the military typically reverts to a zero-
defect mentality between wars; a compliance culture is not supposed to plague the Services
when they are at war.  Or, to put this somewhat differently, being at war is supposed to have
a cleansing effect.  It is not supposed to lead to more of the same, let alone a worsening of
features that have always bothered rising officers: too much risk aversion on the part of
senior leaders compounded by a CYA (cover your ass) mentality and a hang-you-out-to-dry
attitude toward subordinates, and too much sensitivity training and the like.
If, meanwhile, you were to ask defense intellectuals and others familiar with the military for
their take on what has stoked cynicism recently, most would likely cite: the ‘forever’ nature of
today’s wars; the lack of consistent policy; the lack of an overall strategy; the ground hog day
nature of deployments; and/or time away from family.  I do not want to minimize any of
these, since they have been among officers’ concerns, too, but I would now say that what
overarches everything else is loss of faith in senior leaders.  Senior leaders’ inability to change
– or to seem to want to change – how (and for whom) systems internal to the military
work is corrosively demoralizing.
It is the systems internal to the military that dominate discussion while officers are in. 
Career officers seem to now accept that the U.S. is not going to achieve a ‘win’ in any of the
places they have been sent over the past two decades.  Living with this depressing realization
is the price they pay to be able to continue to partake in at least some of the things they do
still find motivating.
Unfortunately, the problem this creates for the military, and for SOF in particular, is that
once officers begin to believe that there is little that they as individuals can do except accept
the status quo, their acceptance of this doesn’t just erode, but inverts traditional notions of
3/21
service.  Already, ‘what’s in it for me?’ is a prevalent American social norm.  What will
happen to SOF when this becomes the defining attitude of most of its professionals? –
particularly since transactional attitudes are already more common than they once were.[3]
Without question, too, if DoD persists with what many regard as totally extraneous social
(re)engineering, as well as overly politically correct compliance training, cynicism is bound to
intensify.  Endless wars in the same hopeless places won’t help.  Perhaps the prospect of
Great Power competition will stave off (or delay) the worst of cynicism’s corrosive effects. 
But to prevail at the sophisticated types of irregular warfare that Great Power competition
calls for means that officers and operators will have to be allowed to stretch themselves and
SOF, something that does not seem to be in the cards right now.
 
Caveat: In what follows I purposely avoid hot button issues like gender and transgender
politics, intersectionality, and other diversity/inclusivity matters.  I do so not because these
are unimportant, but because they attract so much heat and attention already.  Many would
say they attract too much attention – and that the politicization of all of these issues makes
them debilitating distractions from what should be SOF’s (and the military’s) main focus:
training for conflict.  Actually, I would submit that it is the prominence of these issues
that underscores what numerous officers find so dispiriting: senior leaders routinely let them
– and let SOF – down by seeming to be incapable of figuring out how to effectively push back
against wrong-headed, under-informed, and/or ill-advised policy decisions, and by not
fighting for war-oriented changes and policies instead.[4]
Overview – cynicism described
Military cynicism surfaces in plenty of movies and books from World War I onward, but
academically it is a surprisingly understudied topic.  Academics who study civilian workplace
environments have written plenty on cynicism.  According to them, people turn cynical when
too few things are done right; when leadership is bad, blind, or both; and/or when employees
feel disaffected from the larger organization even if they still like their jobs.  Read enough of
what specialists in organizational behavior have to say, and we could (cynically) conclude
that being anywhere but at the top of a hierarchy sets conditions that give rise to cynicism.
[5] 
Cynicism is not wholly bad.  In fact, a degree of cynicism serves an important purpose,
especially in the military.  For instance, ‘expect the worst and you will always be pleasantly
surprised’ represents self-protective cynicism.  When voiced aloud, it also acts as an ideal
social lubricant.  Not only does gallows (or ‘black’) humor help release tension, but it helps
bind those within hearing, helps immunize them against fear, and/or provides an important
mechanism by which to speak truth sarcastically to (or at least about) power.  Maybe this is
why it is only when someone’s carping turns persistently hopeless and relentlessly negative
that peers consider that individual to be problematically cynical.
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Interestingly, none of the officers I sat down with asked for a definition of cynicism, though I
had several handy:
1. An attitude of scornful or jaded negativity, especially a general distrust of the integrity or
professed motives of others: the public cynicism aroused by governmental scandals. 2. A
scornfully or jadedly negative comment or act: "She arrived at a philosophy of her own, all
made up of her private notations and cynicisms" (Henry James).[6]
In common usage, "cynicism" means a disposition to disbelieve in the sincerity or goodness
of human motives and actions, and a tendency to express this by sneers and sarcasm.[7]
Cynicism… can be defined best as both a general and specific attitude, characterized by
frustration and disillusionment as well as negative feelings toward and distrust of a person,
group, ideology, social convention, or institution.[8]
Instead, they usually launched right in:
“Isn’t cynicism being a realist?”
“Cynics have a closed mind: nothing can be done.”
A cynic: “not only can I not do anything more, no one can.”
“It’s an AVF (all volunteer force): cynics are those who see a problem and aren’t willing to fix
it.”
As individual after individual also pointed out, daily life is full of irritants.  One group filled
an entire whiteboard with gripes, and then organized them into buckets:
PowerPoint (PPT) presentations – “A single PPT is like a cancer cell.”
The 5 ‘Ws’[9] – “We now have 30-60 page long CONOPs (concept of the operation).”
Metrics – “There is no measure of accuracy for what is reported.” To which someone added,
“maybe that’s why it is called a storyboard.”
VTCs (video teleconferences) – “[There is] the illusion an actual discussion is taking place
when [in reality] it’s impossible to get down to the nitty-gritty because too many people who
lack the right reference points are included on the VTC.”
Daily SITREPs (situation reports), RFIs (requests for information), and what some refer to as
‘staff overmatch’ – “The battlespace owner and everyone above him crushes us.”
When pushed, the group agreed: it is only really when irritants multiply or are pushed by
toxic leaders that they become truly debilitating.  Of course, the kinds of things that O3s and
O4s find endlessly annoying would probably strike most senior leaders as just that:
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annoyances.  However, from younger officers’ perspective, having to check boxes – or stay in
boxes – is symptomatic of senior leaders’ aversion to risk and senior leaders’ distrust of
them.  Nor would O5s and O6s disagree that risk aversion and distrust are pervasive. 
In fact, as one widely revered (now retired) O6 and former CJSOTF commander put it: “As
COs we’re allowed to push just beyond the bounds, but we’re not given the trust to push those
bounds and reconfigure the strategy on the ground.”[10]  Yet, he wondered, who was better
positioned to understand what was required on the ground than someone who was on his
fifth or sixth deployment, someone who has been interacting with the same local, regional,
and now national leaders for years?
While officers at every level chafe at what they are not allowed to do, younger officers also
bridle at the hypocrisy in being told how much they are being entrusted with, only to then be
second-guessed and micro-managed – “the fact that a one-star is approving a CONOP: how is
that mission command?”  It is the system overall that they find hypocritical.  As a
consequence, it is inanities and inconsistencies in the system that they complain about.
Take compliance training, uniformly required of all individuals regardless of how many times
they might have sat through the same training previously.  Not only are most compliance
requirements considered a waste of time, but worse, they take time away from more
important things.  As Leonard Wong and Stephen Gerras have noted, endless check-the-
block requirements force officers to have to be creatively dishonest; there is not enough time
in the day or the calendar year to be anything but.[11]  Though more disturbing still are the
presumed CYA reasons that the training is required in the first place.  Clearly, most of it
could be thrown out if only senior leaders trusted their men (and women).
As officers rise through the ranks – and see and hear more – their ire shifts.  They still rail
about ‘the system,’ but with specific names and faces attached.  They can list by name those
above and around them who they consider to be short-sighted, under-informed, self-
interested, and/or cynically-motivated – near-peers and superiors who then become the
proximate causes of their own cynicism. 
I will come back to personnel and personalities, but intertwined with who is where, able to do
what to (or for) whom, lurks hypocrisy, one of cynicism’s three horsemen (the other two
being betrayal and loss). 
As one retired O6 described what embittered him, it wasn’t just that he had seen too much
sausage-making, or had had a hand in it himself.  Instead, past a certain point, hypocrisy
from on high increasingly felt like a betrayal.  As he explained: when those who “professed a
certain standard all along then are not there for you” that becomes personal.  “You had their
back; but now something happens and they prove they don’t have yours.”  In his view, few
command-select O6s would be command-select O6s had they not done things as O3s, O4s,
and O5s that they knew flag officers wanted done, that then redounded to those flag officers’
credit.  But then, when things didn’t go well -- ?
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His pregnant pause brought to mind something I had been told years ago about one
particular four-star before he became a four-star.  In his role as a SOC theater commander,
this particular individual urged Special Forces teams operating under his command to
purposely go out and ‘mix it up’; he wanted them to get into firefights.  One explanation for
why he did so was because he was stuck in a tertiary theater, not (yet) in command in
Afghanistan or Iraq where firefights were daily occurrences.  And so, he had to do something
to continue to distinguish himself – not that the officers or the teams who were on the
receiving end of his directive would have objected at the time; if anything, they welcomed the
challenge.  Except – this same eventual four-star was later known to hang officers out to dry,
to include subordinate officers who had no more direct involvement than he did when
aggressive operations elsewhere went awry.  To those who received career-killing reprimands
in the wake of these incidents, his scapegoating of them felt like willful abandonment.
Of course, people can also read someone else’s description of their being thrown under the
bus as sour grapes, and without being able to hear all sides of a story it is often hard to tell
whether the person complaining is a real victim or just a victim in his and his supporters’
minds.  Then, too, where one comes down on what one believes is often a function of one’s
own cynicism, which highlights the hall of mirrors effect cynicism creates. 
For example, here is what one SF one-star wrote shortly after he retired as a terminal one-
star: “senior leaders are not seen as underwriters of mistakes by their subordinates,” but
instead are “managing mistakes and failures of their subordinates to minimize the impact on
themselves.”  Given how centrally placed this one-star had been throughout his career, he
would have known whereof he spoke, but what is ironic about his offering this judgment is
that he himself had a toxic reputation.[12]
Toxicity
According to the literature, toxic leaders are self-aggrandizing, petty, abusive, motivated by
interpersonal malice, and indifferent to the organizational climate they create.[13]  Their
dysfunctional qualities include: deep-seated inadequacy, selfish values, and deceptiveness. 
They are also controlling and overly demanding.
Without question, the fact that individuals with toxic attributes are able to make it into and
then through multiple echelons of command gives rise to lots of cynicism.  But so do toxic
urges and ideas.  Toxic urges and ideas are rarely singled out as a problem because they are
part and parcel of what happens when too much deference is baked into hierarchy.  It is hard
to spend time around the military and not notice how obsequiously deferential a lot of
officers are.  Hierarchy is absolutely essential to good order and discipline, but too much
deference ultimately undermines both.  Actually, nothing better illustrates this than what
happens with good ideas gone toxic. 
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Toxic ideas are ideas that aren’t inherently bad or wrong so much as misguided.  Or they end
up being misapplied.  Think: “three cups of tea.”  Or Village Stability Operations (VSO) and
Afghan Local Police (ALP).  Once the ALP program was deemed successful in some locations
in Afghanistan, it was presumed to be suitable everywhere.  Yet, elders at some VSO sites
wanted no parts of the program.  In at least some locations, elders who opposed ALP had to
then be blackmailed – cleverly set up, but blackmailed nonetheless – into providing recruits
so that teams could make their quotas, something that can hardly be considered a recipe for
fostering goodwill. 
To be clear, it is never just toxic leaders who promote toxic ideas.  The best-intentioned, most
well-respected commanding officers (CO) fall prey.  This is in part because staff members are
prone – maybe even programmed – to defer.  Even when staff members realize an idea is not
the silver bullet the boss might think it is, they rarely correct him: “Once the boss is smitten,
no one steps up to disabuse him.”  Or, as someone else elaborated in relation to SF Major Jim
Gant’s anointment as the ‘Lawrence of Afghanistan,’ “Once Gant became the guy, everyone
below the four-star adopted the attitude, ‘if the boss wants him, I want him.’”  People who
knew Gant had reservations (later proven to be correct when Gant was relieved of command).
[14]  But in response to my obvious question, ‘why didn’t anyone on the CO’s staff speak up at
the time?’ the answer was: “You don’t want to piss off the four-star; he can ruin your life.” 
This is the same reason given for why no one explained to this same four-star that “from
Afghans’ perspective CSTs (female Combat Support Teams) were concubines.”
Meanwhile, the flip side of a four-star being able to ruin subordinates’ lives is how much he,
or anyone with stars, can do for and not just to those working for him – particularly since, no





Officers repeat ‘luck and timing’ like a mantra to account for who does, as opposed to who
doesn’t, receive career-enhancing assignments.  In doing so officers are alluding to the luck of
the draw in initial assignments and who then gets to draft behind whom – which is not to say
that individual merit and effort don’t matter.  But everything else being equal, working under
a CO who is well thought of by those above him proves to be the gift that will keep on giving
so long as that CO continues to rise.
What the catchphrase ‘luck and timing’ leaves out, however, is the third leg of the triangle:
favoritism.  It is actually thanks to favoritism, and not just luck and timing, that entire skeins
of officers are pulled up and along – with Captain X who worked for Colonel Y who himself
was a captain under General Z staying figuratively linked and rising together over the course
of their careers.
Favoritism is inescapable for a multitude of reasons.  Among them: commanders at all levels
are in the business of recognizing and managing future talent.  Consequently, it would be
perverse of them to not want to see their best subordinates continue to excel.  But also, it only
stands to reason that they would want to keep dependable, reliable (and ultimately beholden)
familiars in the fold since ideally these are officers they will be able to tap later on as staff
officers and/or subordinate commanders.
As even the most cynical officers concede, so long as it is ‘good guys’ being selected for
command, everyone should be able to live with a modicum of favoritism.  Or, as one retired
O6 put it, up to O6 “promotion boards work about as right as you can get them.  It’s above
that that it’s all a matter of connections.”  As a senior O5 from a different service concurred:
“Certainly, the perception is that meritocracy gets you to battalion command, and nepotism
everywhere else.” 
According to numerous officers, separate SOF communities recognize early on who they want
on the command track: “people are pushed out of the circle of trust earlier than they
recognize; the pool is so big that it’s not obvious it’s happening.  Usually by the time someone
is an O4 or O5 they understand the patronage system.”  Or as an O6 friend of his from
another service added, “The higher you go, the more hidden the message; the more senior
you get, the less clear it is.  It can then hit you like a ton of bricks.  Maybe you can tell from
the jobs you’re given [whether or not you will keep advancing], but not always.” 
It can also appear from below that GOs themselves are disturbingly insecure, which makes it
all the harder to read the tea leaves: “[Senior] GOs receive no performance reports; instead,
they can vote each other off the island.”  One dynamic that results is that flag officers don’t
just need to keep currying favor with everyone who outranks them, but they have to
continually vie with one another without seeming to compete, meaning there is a lot of
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indirect passive aggressiveness and the maneuvering never ends.  Maneuvering is all the
more attenuated, too, because no one can afford to look out just for his own proteges; he also
has to ensure his rivals’ picks aren’t in position(s) to out-compete his. 
Unfortunately, machinations mean that while some officers get help from above, others
remain totally unprotected, especially if their commanding officers have been mediocre, can’t
write good OERs (officer evaluations), or get off the command track and/or leave the service
early.  Here is where ‘luck and timing’ definitely come into play, although perhaps nothing
throws the importance of protection into starker relief than what happens during official
internal investigations – from who chooses the investigators, to how the results are handled,
to who gets hammered and made an example of.  Everyone intently reads these tea leaves,
too.  Among the takeaways whenever punishments appear selectively applied or reprimands
are issued (or issued, withdrawn, and reissued as has happened recently) is that you had
better be part of someone’s network and/or know someone who can provide top cover:
otherwise, your career will be over if anyone under you ever does anything wrong. 
Of course, this really is no different from what is required to stay on track for further
command: essentially “you need someone to pay homage to.  Job moves complicate staying
in touch, but if you get off track or beyond a mentor’s radar, you’re done.” 
In theory, networking would seem to run counter to the attributes the military extols:
integrity, service above self, and excellence in all you do.  But in reality, with each Service
akin to a giant gameboard, ambitious officers are given little choice but to act the part of
clients vis a vis those above them and like patrons to capable officers below them, and then
ideally the whole skein will continue to advance together. 
Sometimes all of this jockeying gets to be too much or officers discover that there are
problems with those they have hitched themselves to, or they question the integrity of the
system as a whole.  O6s can be particularly critical of those directly above them given the
personality changes they see occur:
They [flag officers] come back from Capstone and something has happened to them there;
they are completely different.  Capstone must be a cross between Bohemian Grove and a
finishing school; maybe they sodomize each other and it’s captured on film… They can’t say
‘no’ to each other; they become professional cheerleaders for the organization.
Or, as an O6 who spent considerable time working with and for some of SOF’s best known
senior leaders discovered: “If you buy into core values – integrity, service above self,
excellence in all you do – you’re naïve, too naïve to operate at a senior level.” 
*  *  *
Again, what should be most sobering about perspectives like these is that the Army, Navy,
and Air Force officers I am citing are officers who haven’t just been among SOF’s ‘best and
brightest’ – by SOF’s own standards – but they are among those who deployed to
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Afghanistan and Iraq early on in both wars and came home hopeful.  They looked forward to
bad leaders, bad practices, and bad ideas being weeded out; their study of military history
taught them that the system re-sets by, with, and through war.  Yet, this is not what
happened.  Or as one former O6 offered by way of example: when he was the CJSOTF
commander in Decade Two of the war in Afghanistan, he was required to call the one-star Air
Defense officer rather than the SF general directly above him to get Level One CONOP
approval because no one had confidence in his SF boss.  “So then,” in his words, “why was
that SF one-star there in the first place?”
 
Or, more to the point: why was he a one-star at all?
To have leaders rise to the top of a very narrow, highly competitive pyramid who then fail to
live up to ideals or expectations is profoundly demoralizing.  Even worse, though, in this
former O6’s view, is when the rare general officer who can walk the talk finally makes it into
a position where he can implement all of the changes that he always told his proteges he
would make – but he doesn’t.  Most officers can count on one hand (if that) the number of
leaders they have wanted to follow.  Thus, when one of these rare individuals makes it
through all of the wickets, is finally on top, and fails to deliver, that feels like a betrayal.  It
also feels personal.  It especially bothers those who are in the running to become general
officers themselves and who, given everything that they have seen, done, and been asked to
do, have needed to continue to believe that change is eventually possible – or else, what is the
point?
Covenant-level betrayal of a career-long, inter-personal sort is probably the worst kind of
betrayal there is, while betrayal, we should remember, is one of the three horsemen of
cynicism, along with hypocrisy and loss.  A trailing fourth horseman is hopelessness. 
Hopeless-ness
Forty years ago, the military had to worry about junior officer retention.  Then-Air Force
Captain Ron Keys recounted some of the reasons why in his famous ‘Dear Boss letter,’ sent to
his ultimate boss, the Tactical Air Command commander in 1979.  As a Small Wars Journal
article noted in 2012, Keys’ letter, which resurfaced in 1997 and then again in 2009, could
just as easily have been written in 2012 (or today).  Here is SWJ’s take:
Young officers aren’t chafing against high operational tempo or demanding tactical
requirements.  They are chafing against a bureaucracy that misplaces its incentives, fails to
penalize underperformers, rewards overperformers only with more work (but not removing
the incompetents from the ranks around and above them), fails to prioritize the institution’s
efforts and expenditures (empty MWR facilities, embarrassing swing bands, etc.), fails to
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properly care for its people (this is not a money problem – most officers are vastly
overcompensated today – but a personnel management problem), and focuses on inane
superficialities rather than combat excellence, just to name a few.[16]
I do not want to minimize the significance of junior officer retention ever.  But – shouldn’t an
equally pressing concern be: who is staying in for junior officers to be able to model
themselves on? 
So, who is staying in past 20 in SOF today?  In addition to those who have finally made it into
command, the default cynical answer would be: those for whom machinations are fun,
interesting, and/or at least tolerable, to include just enough Happy Warriors to keep the
system afloat. 
‘Happy Warriors’ is my term for those who loyally help keep the system functioning.  Happy
Warriors are individuals who may be cynical, but don’t feel disaffected enough to exit.  They
include many O6s who are genuinely grateful to have made it as high as O6.  Maybe getting
to be a company or battalion commander sufficed; maybe something happened along the way
to make rising above O6 impossible; alternatively, other priorities (e.g. family) might have
surfaced midway through someone’s career.  Regardless, all Happy Warriors (as I am using
the term) remain dedicated patriots.  They are smart, highly capable problem-solvers, and
while they haven’t lost their competitive edge, they just aren’t as driven to have to (still) be #1
as others are.  Two other features that distinguish Happy Warriors are that few seem to fall
into the trap of regarding themselves as strategic thinkers or visionaries when they are not,
and most prize loyalty.  Sometimes they are overly loyal to their bosses; more often their
allegiance is to the enterprise. 
In short, Happy Warriors still believe.  Chief among the things they believe in is the worth of
those who work around and for them.  Like so many career members of the military, Happy
Warriors are acutely aware of the sacrifices that others have made and they take pride in
belonging to a long line of men and women who continue to pay it forward.
Ironically then, it turns out to be Happy Warriors who most epitomize integrity, service
above self, and excellence in all they do.  Of course, in a further irony this also means that
they become an impediment.  What do I mean?  Happy Warriors don’t upset the status quo;
as good citizens, they don’t rock the boat.  Again, they are the reason the system continues to
work as well as it does, but consequently, for anyone interested in system change, the
combination of Happy Warriors and reluctant, risk averse, overly political (small ‘p’) senior
leaders make orchestrating change extremely difficult. 
Actually, it is not clear that the synergy between Happy Warriors and go-along-to-get-along
senior leaders can be overcome without considerable structural changes to the system first.
Compounding factors
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What, meanwhile, constitutes ‘the system’?  Here we could invoke President Eisenhower and
cite the military-industrial complex, or David Hackworth who one-upped Eisenhower with
his military-industrial-Congressional complex.  Post-9/11 we would also need to throw in
intelligence and acknowledge that along with the expansion of the military-intelligence
complex across the National Capital Region and beyond, there has also been a progressive
fudging of the lines between things that the military can still do for itself and things that it
has to outsource.  Although dependence on defense contractors has captured quite a bit of
attention since 9/11, the trends that contractors exemplify have received much less – they
deserve more.  Two of these trends are: 1) the monetization of service, and 2) the ubiquity of
transactionalism.  
Exhibit one in the monetization of service: when SOF officers retire today, they can
market themselves in many more ways than SOF officers could two or three decades ago. 
Senior officers do especially well by writing books, giving speeches, peddling leadership
lessons, becoming talking heads on television… there is almost nothing SOF credentials can’t
be used to sell.  In some regards, this is quintessentially American.  But – when former
general officers (especially) suddenly, visibly, and even proudly rake in hefty fees on the heels
of their having extolled ‘selfless service’ to others for decades – and don’t care how this
looks – their behavior strikes more than just a few of the people they previously commanded
as obscene. 
Push beyond the unseemliness of general officers cashing in, though, and the extent to which
they do so suggests an even more deep-seated issue: when retired flag officers behave as
though they believe they aren’t just worth, but actually might be owed more than a six-figure
retirement in exchange for sitting on corporate boards, making speeches, meting out advice,
lobbying former colleagues and subordinates, and the like, we should wonder: what trickle-
down effects does their ability to finally ‘get theirs’ have?
In 2015, Forrest Crowell, a serving Navy SEAL, documented just how extensively former
SEALs have used their prior service to personal, political, and financial advantage.[17] 
Apparently, Naval Special Warfare’s leadership is still wrestling with what, if anything, it can
or should do to put the SEAL brand back in the bottle.  But while former SEALs may be more
notorious than others for selling their special-ness, they are hardly alone.  Nor is it hard to
understand why operators might go out of their way to capitalize on their service-related
skills given how short-lived public adulation and fascination can be.  Yet, those brandishing
the brand aren’t just individuals trying to making a living once they are out.  Increasingly,
some men (and now women) join SOF in order to be able to turn their Trident or tab into
something more; they join with the express aim of burnishing themselves.  This marks a
significant shift.
It used to be that if you managed to pass through Navy SEAL or Army Green Beret selection
and made it onto a team, that was ‘it’; nothing you did later in life was likely to prove as
satisfying or more rewarding.  Nor was belonging to a team regarded as a stepping stone to
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anything else.[18]  Yet, parlaying as a goal now enables more than just a few SOF officers
(and operators) to turn ‘having been’ a SEAL or Green Beret into personal capital.   
 
Again, to be fair, many more entrepreneurial opportunities exist today than existed exist
three, four, or five decades ago.  To be sure, too, we Americans have long been encouraged to
seize the day and, thanks to luck and literal timing, more of us can; not only are we able to
transact with anyone, anywhere, for virtually anything we want these days, but we can sell
anything to anyone provided we can create a market for it.[19]  Maybe it shouldn’t be
surprising, then, that ‘what’s in it for me?’ has become so pervasive an attitude, one that may
be associated with Millennials, but that clearly suffuses society.  Case in point: former general
officers openly cashing in. 
The fact that there is a market for all things SOF explains one dimension of the monetization
that has occurred.  But transactionalism runs much deeper than just the commodification
of SOF (to use Forrest Crowell’s term).  Transactionalism can be thought of in a couple of
different ways.  As we have already seen, there is what’s in it for me.  Then, there is the flip
side of what’s in it for me, which is ‘what can you do for me?’  Or, better yet in the SOF
realm: ‘what can I get you to do for me?’  One problem with each of these is that they are as
antithetical to working with other people as is putting service after self.
To illustrate why, let’s consider transactionalism overseas.  SOF is an expeditionary
force. Not only are relationships essential to successfully operating in other people’s
countries, but Americans on their own can’t conduct Foreign Internal Defense or
Unconventional Warfare.  Nor do unilateral counter-insurgency, counter-proliferation, or
counter-terrorism campaigns work particularly well either.  Maybe at some point in the
future it will be possible to fashion reliable partnerships out of expedient quid pro quos.  But
for the long moment it still takes time – as in years, if not decades – to secure trust.  And
while sweat equity, shared risk, and mutual sacrifice can help quickset trust, sustaining it
requires ongoing meaningful effort.  Also, reputations travel fast.  Earn a reputation for
neglect or for not acting in good faith, and regardless of however much good will particular
individuals will have banked, Americans as a whole become suspect. 
Everyone in SOF should recognize this dynamic given how important reputations are within
SOF communities.  But curiously, SOF senior leaders use terms like ‘trustful relationships’
without seeming to realize how their playbook approach to short, serial deployments cuts
against any such thing, as if sending different sets of operators and officers to work with the
same units that have been partnered with by umpteen different sets of Americans already
won’t incentivize everyone to behave in opportunistic ways. 
Tellingly, students in my long-running military advisor class would often volunteer that all
they needed to do was to act as though they cared (emphasis on the word ‘act’), and they
would be effective.  But, as foreign classmates sitting right beside them might have, but were
15/21
too polite to tell them: other people aren’t quite so easily fooled, and any American who
thinks he is pulling the wool over counterparts’ eyes usually sets himself up to be used in
turn.  More than once when I asked O3s and even young O4s whether they really thought it
was possible to go overseas and successfully ‘manipulate’ (their word of choice) other people
at home in their countries, I was told that, well, advising is akin to a mutual ‘use’ job, so ‘yes
– they can.’ 
Perhaps.  But whenever I heard these young officers treat relationships as a transactional
means to some clever end, I cringed.  None of them liked it when senior leaders weren’t
genuine with them.  They also didn’t like it when they suspected they weren’t being told the
truth.  So, why would they think that foreign ‘partners’ might feel any less differently about
being fed a line – unless they assumed that foreigners are easily fooled which, I tried to
remind them, is an extraordinarily dangerous thing to presume in the 21  century.
*  *  *
Transgressions are another set of challenges associated with transactionalism.  Not only
does a transactional what’s in it for me approach belie being able to establish ‘trustful
relationships,’ but such an approach invites everyone to try to get away with whatever they
can as often as they can.  The evidence?  All sorts of transgressions have occurred over the
past two decades.  Worth noting is that transgressions have occurred both in and out of war
zones, and so while it has been easy to attribute most bad behavior to the caustic impact of
20 years of war, there is likely more to it than this since it is not as though only combat
veterans have committed crimes, broken rules, and skirted regulations.  Or to come at drugs,
alcohol, assaults, ‘zipper problems,’ corruption, and the like from a slightly different angle,
aren’t these all just further manifestations of transactional, what’s in it for me-ism run
amuck? 
At the same time, whenever adults are treated as adolescents they will usually, eventually
revert to behaving like adolescents, especially if they are kept in adolescence for a prolonged
period of time.  Or, to cite a second truism: micro-management tends to make people want to
rebel, particularly when they are already prone to question authority, which SOF legend and
lore suggest is a defining characteristic of SOF operators.  As for a third truism: in most jobs
people reach a point when they begin to question why certain inefficiencies persist.  Ergo
impatience when things don’t work as well as they could (or should) – people get testy and
impatient, and begin to bend or ignore the rules, especially when rules stand in the way of
being able to get something done.
Some rules, too, are stupid.  Maybe no one foresaw a well-intentioned rule’s unintended
consequences or maybe the need for it has become outmoded.  Smart organizations actually
don’t need many rules.  They need a handful of ‘thou shall nots,’ rules that represent that
organization’s redlines.  So long as these rules are uniformly enforced (and they shouldn’t be
rules if they can’t be), thou shall nots help delimit and define the organization’s culture.  They
st
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also permit those at the top to delegate oversight downward, where it belongs.  By letting
command teams convey their own ‘should nots’ – things that command teams expect those
under them to know not to do – organizations stay supple. 
Ironically, this is how most civilians assume command and control in the military already
works.  And doubtless top-down and bottom-up trust could be restored if SOF and the
military overall reined in their corporate thou shall nots and instead allowed subordinate
leaders to formulate appropriate ‘should nots.’  At a minimum, resynching accountability
with authority would realign command and control.  It also would grant apprentice leaders at
every level the opportunity to both test and prove their leadership potential. 
In theory, none of this should be difficult.  SOF, after all, prides itself on admitting
individuals who want to surpass, never mind live up to expectations.  Though to ensure that
there is truth in advertising here, too, SOF would have to return to being unforgivingly
serious about frontloading quality control, something best done through assessment and
selection, periodic review, and de-selection and reassignment – especially since trying to
micro-manage quality control after the fact and once people are in only creates problems.    
Further suggestions – and in sum
There are actually a host of internal adjustments SOF could – and not just should – make to
mitigate cynicism’s cumulative effects.  For instance, while some might contend that as soon
as personnel and HR systems are finally brought into the 21st century, and the right person
can be slotted into the right  job, this will alleviate a lot of current frustrations.  But – while
HR fixes will certainly help, it will still be leaders who make or break the system.  Officers
(like operators) still need to hear certain things from their commanders.  Otherwise, leaders
aren’t leading and the command structure will continue to needlessly disaffect too many O5s
and O6s who then become toxic versions of Happy Warriors.
UnHappy Warriors are O5s and O6s who wear the rank but feel aggrieved.  Unlike Happy
Warriors, UnHappy Warriors are not at peace with a two-tier status system.  They resent the
fact that those on the command track are treated as favorite sons (or daughters) when, in
their view, they (as non-command officers) are just as essential and perform vital functions. 
It rankles them when they don’t receive the respect that they think they deserve, which
causes more than a few to then throw around what rank they do have, usually by saying ‘no’
to others or by pouring cold water on others’ ideas.
The O6 who first raised the issue of disrespect with me was unusual; he wasn’t critical of the
peers who passed him by; he actually regarded them as good, deserving guys.  As he
explained, he knew after O5 command that he wouldn’t screen for O6 command.  What he
objected to instead was the manner in which he had been informed: his command didn’t
treat him like an adult, his word.  Nor did it treat him “as someone who deserved the courtesy
of being told directly ‘you are not the kind of leader we are looking for.’”  No senior leader sat
down with him.  Instead, his chain of command treated him with, as he put it, “willful
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neglect.”  Essentially, he became a still-serving has-been, but one whose ongoing
commitment was taken for granted.  Indeed, the system seemed to count on his willingness
to still give his all or, as a sardonic O4 once put it, the system counts on people being
chumps.  This matches what a former USASFC chief of staff told me when he explained how
he finally decided to cut the cord and retire: “the system doesn’t care; it’ll keep using you
until you’re all used up.”[20]
But – no one wants to feel used.  Feeling used unnecessarily torques people.  It is also
avoidable.  In the words of the O6 who initially raised disrespect with me: just “don’t
engage in willful neglect.” 
Of course, not wanting to feel used also holds for those in operational command. 
Certainly, no commander that I know has wanted to think that he might have lost or was
going to have to put at risk anyone under his command on behalf of hollow policy.  Up to a
point, officers seem able to rationalize the operational non sequiturs they have been asked to
engage in by believing that every mission must be additive; it must serve some larger
strategic purpose – especially if everyone just keeps forging ahead…  But then, let officers get
a glimpse behind the curtain and see that, in fact, no larger strategy or coherent policy exists,
and their faith dissolves.  Their natural reaction is to then begin to do hand waves back up
the chain of command.  Or, to be truly cynical about what occurs, once smart officers come to
believe that the arc of fighting doesn’t bend to anywhere, then why not preferentially look
after ‘them and theirs,’ especially since this, too, is one of their many duties?  
If, meanwhile, we ignore all of the political (and not just policy-related) directives that are
about to roil the military from without – vis a vis equity, inclusivity, and other externally
generated pressures – one thing seems evident: SOF has more than enough internally
generated issues to attend to without needing any more.  Among them: when decent enough
leaders have toxic ideas; when promising leaders betray their promise; when senior leaders
don’t deliver; and when an otherwise meritocratic system fails to appear meritocratic beyond
the rank of O6, officers find it difficult to remain sanguine.  One reason officers can’t remain
sanguine is that, to the military’s own credit, from basic training onward everyone in uniform
has been taught that units are only as strong as their weakest link.  SOF units, in particular,
live by this.  So, when SOF officers regard their senior leaders as SOF’s weakest link, not only
does this signal a problem, it is a problem.  Unfortunately, it is also a problem whose impacts
are all too easy to identify: if senior leaders don’t (or can’t) learn to self-correct more quickly,
and/or don’t (or can’t) trust those under them to do the right thing, SOF will lose more of its
most promising officers, thereby further shrinking its pool of daring future leaders.  Not only
will this be terrible for SOF, it will be dreadful for the country.
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Note: I owe a large debt of gratitude to everyone, both in the U.S. as well as overseas (officers,
NCOs, and spouses), who took the time to help me try to think through this critically
important, but less than happy topic.
[1] Jonathan Waldman, Rust: The Longest War (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2015), p.
139.
[2] Because an Army, Air Force, or Marine captain (O3) is not the same as a Navy captain
(O6), I use ‘O’ ranks.  For anyone unfamiliar with these designations, O3 in the U.S. system
refers to Army, Air Force, or Marine captains and Navy lieutenants.  O4 refers to Army, Air
Force, or Marine majors and Navy lieutenant commanders.  O5 refers to Army, Air Force, or
Marine lieutenant colonels and Navy commanders.  O6 refers to Army, Air Force, or Marine
colonels and Navy captains.  Flag officers are O7s and above, referred to as admirals in the
Navy and generals or general officers (GOs) in the other three Services. 
[3] Of course, who is where in terms of cynicism also depends on where officers are in the arc
of their careers, since some have been exposed to more senior level decision-making than
others have, thanks to time spent as aides or in key staff positions.  This, though, is just one
of the ways in which timing matters.  Other ways in which timing matters include: where and
under whom officers have served, as well as where the military is along the arc of conflict
(presuming there is an arc to conflict, which there may no longer be).
[4] I should note, too, that the project this article draws from examined cynicism from a
number of additional angles.  For instance, this article does not address corruption or a slew
of other ethical issues.  Nor does it discuss the relationship between cynicism and PTSD,
cynicism’s impact on ‘lessons learned’ and PME, or the tricky issue of cynicism and
hindsight.  As a topic, cynicism could easily yield a dissertation or two, especially for those
interested in being comparative.  It would be fascinating to examine cynicism over time
and/or across space, as in other countries’ experiences, and even comparatively across
different types of units.
[5] At the same time, the national mood also needs to be taken into account since it, too,
plays a role in cynicism.  Consider, for instance, how sociologist Jeffrey Goldfarb opened his
book, entitled The Cynical Society: the “single most pressing challenge facing American
democracy today is widespread public cynicism.”  And that was his first sentence 30 years
ago.  Alternatively, we could go further back, to Albert O. Hirschman’s classic work, Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty.  In the late 1960s, Hirschman (an economist) couldn’t figure out why
more high-ranking government officials weren’t resigning in protest over the Vietnam War. 
He did not focus on the military specifically, but had he done so he might have noted that for
all of the similarities between the military and other government bureaucracies and
institutions, the military remains unique.  Not only do the Services lock individuals in and
prohibit them from being able to honorably exit at will (unlike every other institution except
prison), but stuck as service members are, they need to have some indirect way to voice
frustration and vent.  Ergo, cynicism. 
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[6] American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fifth Edition.
[7] https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_cynicism.html
[8] Lynne Andersson and Thomas Bateman, “Cynicism in the workplace: some causes and
effects,” Journal of Organizational Behavior (18), 1997, p. 450.
[9] Refers to the need to detail: who, what, when, where, and why.
[10] Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force.
[11] Leonard Wong and Stephen Gerras, Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army
Profession (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute), February 2015.
[12] Which is also one reason I do not want to identify him by name; I don’t want his
comment to be dismissed.
[13] See, for instance, George Reed, “Toxic leadership,” Military Review, July-August 2004;
George Reed, Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the U.S. Military (Potomac Books, 2015); and
James Dobbs and James Do, “The impact of perceived toxic leadership in officer candidates,”
Armed Forces & Society (45:1), 2019.
[14] For more on Jim Gant, see https://warontherocks.com/2014/04/the-rise-and-fall-of-
major-jim-gant/ or David Edwards, ”‘The perfect counterinsurgent’: reconsidering the case of
Major Jim Gant,” Small Wars & Insurgencies (31:2), 2020.
[15] From: Stabilized Tactical Airborne Body Operations.
[16] https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-dear-boss-saga
[17] Forrest Crowell, Navy SEALs Gone Wild: Publicity, Fame, and the Loss of the Quiet
Professional, NPS Masters thesis, December 2015.
[18] Something that began to change with the invention of SEAL Team Six and Delta Force,
followed by Special Mission Units – all of which developed the reputation for being more
elite, and thus worth striving to move on (or up) to.
[19] True even during COVID-19, despite the hardships it has imposed – particularly when
one looks at the world of e-commerce.
. 
[20] U.S. Army Special Forces Command.
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Comments
Anna, No suprise at the…
Anna,
No suprise at the insightful and provocative analysis. It resonates, as do all articles and
discussions/classes you write & lead.
I do think, one point that could be emphasized perhaps more is the idea of selfishness versus
selflessness. Military officers are groomed in practice to orient on their career and look out
for their service above all else, even more than their ultimate purpose - the defense of their
nation. The military is driven by Service components who wilfullly detach their operational
effectiveness from the theater commands and use it as an excuse to make self-serving
decisions that in no way contribute to strategic purpose. This decision making drives
incentives in force management toward organizationally beneficial directions, but are
misaligned from effective operational practices - ie ad-hoc rotational deployment, or cookie
cutter (VSO/ALP) practices that you reference in your article. I believe many if not most
junior SOF officers sense this mis-alignment but are not able to communicate it effectively.
Essentially it boils down to selfishness. The DoD-dominated by service components that
excuse their detachment from strategic decision making based on the system (ie GCP - GCC).
This systemic internal focus on the good of the organization over the good of the nation -
reinforced by a promotion system completely detached from relevent operational measures
of effectiveness also perpetuates individual selfishness. The type of individual selfishness that
choses to remain silent IOT not make the boss unhappy. Or the type of selfishness groomed
by senior leaders' example to base all actions around taking the next step or being promoted
to the next rank. It is sad to watch - often times senior leaders only start effectively leading
when they know they no longer have a chance to step up the ladder.
We need to start breeding, by example, that decisions need to be driven first, not by what is
good for your organizational service, but what is good for the nation and its defense. Not by
what is the next best step for your career, but for what will contribute to national secruity.
After considering that then, consider yourself. 
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The prioritized Mission, the Men, and Me or Ship, Shipmate, Self are still taught, they are
just not applied and instead overcome by selfish priorities that place bureacracy and
individuals above all else.
-Paul
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